Have Pro-Abortion Politicians Excommunicated Themselves?

Posted on October 21, 2010 by canonlawmadeeasy

Q: We heard a priest give a homily around the time of the last election, talking about “Catholic” politicians who always vote pro-abortion. He said that these politicians have already excommunicated themselves. But he didn’t explain that. Is that right? How on earth can you excommunicate yourself?  –Patti

A: The issue of excommunication, as noted back in “Am I Excommunicated? Sanctions, Part I,” is greatly misunderstood in general, and thus is always worth a closer look. But Patti’s question is especially relevant at this time, since important elections are looming in this country in the next couple of weeks. Let’s look first at some of the general features of the Church’s system of imposing penalties, and then focus more specifically on the politicians whom Patti mentions.

Even if most of us have no personal experience of the American criminal justice system, we all know at least basically how it works. Laws are passed by our legislators; if someone violates those laws, he is arrested and tried in a court proceeding; and eventually he is either convicted or exonerated. If he is convicted, the criminal is then sentenced to a specific punishment. It’s a logical system that we all take for granted—and many other countries do too.

But the Catholic Church, as we know, operates in a more spiritual sphere. True, there are laws promulgated by competent legislators (generally the Pope or the diocesan bishop), and there is certainly a process that can be employed when someone is accused of violating one of those laws. There are also punishments that can be, and sometimes are, meted out. But the Church’s penal system is in some ways fundamentally different from the American legal system, which is why American Catholics frequently find it so bewildering. We assume that it works in a certain way… and it often doesn’t.

Canon 1314 describes two basic types of penalties. Penalties that are ferendae sententiae are not binding on the perpetrator until they are actually imposed. Latae sententiae penalties, however, are incurred ipso facto upon the commission of a delict (i.e., a crime), if the law specifies this.

Even if you’re a Latin scholar, canon 1314 is far from clear, isn’t it? Our first difficulty involves translation of the technical terms. The English language unfortunately has no clean, simple way to translate either ferendae or latae sententiae, which is why we find ourselves obliged to use the Latin words, even when talking about canon law in our native tongue. But basically, a penalty that is specified in the code as being ferendae sententiae has to be formally imposed by competent authority. We saw an example of a delict that is punishable by a ferendae sententiae penalty back in “Can Catholics Become Freemasons?” Canon 1374 states that a person who joins an association that plots against the Church is to be punished with a just penalty. The wording of the last part of that sentence tells us that we are dealing here with a ferendae sententiae punishment. Competent authority—most commonly a diocesan bishop—learns that a Catholic in his diocese has joined such an organization, does some investigating, and then can, if he determines it is just, impose a punishment on that Catholic.

This is the type of penalty that we Americans can relate to! In this situation, the bishop essentially is acting like a court judge. The imposition of a penalty is akin to being sentenced by a judge after getting convicted. In other words, the general method of imposing ferendae sententiae penalties is quite comprehensible to us.

But it’s the other type, the latae sententiae penalties, that creates the most confusion.  Our criminal justice system has absolutely nothing like them—because this is where the spiritual element of the Church’s penal system kicks in. As we just saw, canon 1314 notes that latae sententiae penalties are incurred ipso facto if the law says so. Let’s look at a concrete example so that we can see how the system is designed to work when this type of penalty is involved.

Canon 1388.1 states that a priest who directly violates the sacramental seal, revealing what a penitent told him in the confessional, incurs a latae sententiae excommunication. (This particular delict was in fact discussed in more detail in “Can a Priest Ever Reveal What is Said in Confession?”) By the grace of God, this crime rarely happens; but let’s nevertheless imagine a priest who repeats the contents of a confession in a manner that directly identifies the penitent. What happens next?

First of all, it has to be determined whether all the conditions of canon 1323 have been met. This canon provides a whole list of situations, any one of which will render a person not liable to a penalty. These conditions were addressed in greater detail in both “Am I Excommunicated? Sanctions, Part I,” and “Is She Excommunicated? Sanctions, Part II,” but briefly, no Catholic is subject to any penalty if he is under the age of 16; was ignorant that his action was a violation of the law; was forced to commit the crime, or committed it under fear; acted in self-defense or in the defense of another; or lacked the use of reason (as is the case with mentally ill, mentally handicapped, and senile persons).

If even one of these conditions applies to the imaginary confessor-priest we are talking about here, he is not subject to the penalty found in canon 1388.1. As horrible as his actions might be, he would not—could not—be punished.

But let’s now imagine that this priest did not fall into any of these categories. Let’s say he acted knowingly, freely, and deliberately when he broke the seal of the confessional, and knew the penalty attached to that crime. What happens to him now?

Well, it is possible that the penitent, or some other person, may complain about this priest’s conduct to his bishop. If the bishop (with, for this particular crime, the involvement of the Vatican as well) is able to establish after an investigation that the priest did indeed violate the sacramental seal, and was fully responsible for his actions, he may declare that this priest is excommunicated. But if there is insufficient evidence to prove it, we lay-Catholics naturally assume that no penalty is incurred. And this is where we are wrong.

Because a latae sententiae penalty is incurred whether the crime can be proven or not. In fact, a latae sententiae punishment is incurred even if nobody else on earth ever finds out about the crime! Nobody has to complain to the bishop about our fictitious priest’s violation of the seal, and no investigation need ever take place. The fact is, whether or not anyone besides the priest himself realizes it, the priest is excommunicated.

We can see here the spiritual side of the Church’s penal system. If you commit a delict that is punishable by a latae sententiae penalty, and you know what you are doing and freely do it anyway, you are, ipso facto, under that penalty, whether church authorities formally declare it or not. It may very well be that the only ones who actually realize this are our imaginary priest, and God Himself—but that in no way changes the reality of the situation. In this case, the bishop doesn’t have to actually impose a thing. This imaginary priest has excommunicated himself.

So, assuming that our fictitious priest has incurred a latae sententiae excommunication under 1388.1, what is he supposed to do now? Since he is a priest, trained in theology, we may hope that he realizes that excommunication is (as noted in c. 1312.1 n. 1) a medicinal penalty. Its whole purpose is to warn a Catholic who falls under this penalty that he has removed himself by his actions from communion with the Catholic Church.

Unless an excommunicated Catholic truly doesn’t care any more about maintaining communion with the Church, he logically will seek to restore that communion. The procedure for lifting an excommunication can in certain circumstances be a bit complicated, but in general, a safe bet is to go to confession and confess the crime (which by definition is also sinful, so it bears confessing in any case!).The confessor may very well be able to lift the excommunication himself, on the spot, along with granting the penitent sacramental absolution.

In some cases—like the delict committed by our imaginary priest, who violated the seal—lifting the censure may be reserved to the Holy See.  That may require the confessor to petition the Vatican on behalf of the penitent (without ever identifying the penitent, of course), and the excommunication will be lifted in that way.  The situation may vary depending on the delict, on the faculties a particular bishop grants to the priests who hear confessions in his diocese, or even on the confessor himself—Jesuits, for example, have very broad authority in the confessional to lift censures, an authority which other priests normally do not have. But in general, an excommunicated Catholic should always start by entering the confessional.

Now we’ve seen that the priest who preached the homily which Patti describes was correct, for it is indeed possible for Catholics to excommunicate themselves. What, then, are the implications for Catholic politicians who support abortion “rights”?

Theologically speaking, this seems like it should be extremely straightforward. It’s pretty difficult for even the simplest Catholic in the pew to rationalize that one can repeatedly vote for the legalization (and maybe also the funding) of the willful murder of unborn children, and yet remain a Catholic in good standing!

Canonically, however, it’s a bit more complex—not because canon law is in conflict with Catholic theology in this case (for the two can never contradict each other), but because there are so many steps that must be taken, and conditions that must be met, before one can say with certainty that Senator X or Representative Y is under excommunication. The fact is, excommunication can sort of be seen as the Church’s “nuclear option.” It is only used as absolutely the last possible resort, when all warnings have failed and it is crystal-clear that the perpetrator truly knows all the ramifications of what he is doing—and freely chooses to do it anyway.  Let’s walk our way through the canons in the code that might logically apply in this case, and examine the wording before making any assumptions or jumping to conclusions about our politicians.

First of all, there is no canon in the code that specifically says that voting to support abortion is an excommunicable offense. In fact, there is nothing explicit in the code that even says it is a crime at all! The lone canon that mentions abortion (c. 1398) states that someone who actually procures an abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication. It’s a canon of few words, but they are carefully crafted to pertain only to persons directly involved in a particular abortion—the doctor, the nurse(s), a husband/boyfriend who pressures a woman to abort and may threaten her or even physically take her to the clinic and pay for the procedure, and obviously the woman herself are all potentially up for excommunication if they are Catholics.  Once again, all the conditions in the abovementioned canon 1323 must be met before any of these people can be considered excommunicated.

But the taxi-driver who takes the woman to the doctor without knowing what she intends to do, or the friend who loans her the money to pay for the abortion without realizing what she wants it for, are not. By extension, the plumber or electrician who ensures that the doctor’s office can function, the staffer at the phone company who accepts a yellow-pages ad for the doctor’s “abortion services,” or the pizza deliveryman who brings lunch to the doctor and his staff so that they can continue working through the afternoon, are not culpable at all (although one can easily understand that many Catholic plumbers and other workers would balk at being asked to help an abortionist in even an indirect way!). The point is, there is a strict limitation to the persons who are covered by canon 1398.

One could perhaps try to argue that pro-abortion politicians, by voting to keep abortion legal, should fall under this canon…but given its precise wording, it would be difficult to find a canonist who would agree. And in any case, the mere fact of the uncertainty of the question would automatically oblige us to conclude that the canon does not apply in this case: canon 18 states that laws that prescribe a penalty are to be interpreted strictly. If there is any doubt about whether a Catholic should be punished under a particular canon, he is not to be punished—period. This is a fundamental legal principle that the Church has held for generations, and it admits of no exceptions. We can see how carefully the Catholic Church guards against unjust application of its laws—it prefers, if necessary, to permit a perpetrator to go unpunished, rather than to unfairly penalize someone who is not guilty of a crime!

Thus we cannot say that a pro-abortion politician is excommunicable under canon 1398—but there are certainly other canons that might better apply, and that would lead to exactly the same outcome.  A stronger argument could be made that repeatedly voting to support legalized abortion, in the face of countless public statements by Popes and Bishops that this is contrary to Catholic teaching, might constitute heresy. Let’s take a look.

Canon 1364.1 states that an apostate, a heretic or a schismatic incurs a latae sententiae excommunication. If this can be applied to a pro-abortion politician, then he can indeed be excommunicated. Once again, this may sound very straightforward on the surface. Surely someone who votes for legalized abortion is violating church teachings, which must mean that he has to be a heretic, an apostate, or a schismatic by definition, right?

And once again, we must tread very cautiously before reaching the conclusion that the canonical “nuclear option” applies here. The principles determining what constitutes apostasy, heresy or schism are at their origin theological rather than canonical, and as such they are more nuanced than a canon lawyer, who tends to think more in concrete, black-and-white terms, might like them to be. In fact, the difficulty in “translating” these theological concepts into legalese suitable for the code proved to be so confusing that Pope John Paul II found it necessary (as we’ll see in a moment) to subsequently rewrite some of the canons in order better to clarify them.

Canon 751 defines as concretely as possible what these three terms mean in general. Heresy is the obstinate denial after baptism of a truth which must be believed with divine and Catholic faith. Apostasy is the total repudiation of the Christian faith. Schism is the withdrawal of submission to the Pope, or from communion with the faithful who are subject to him. Can we apply any of these to pro-abortion Catholic politicians?

For starters, any politician who insists that he is still a practicing Catholic in good standing apparently does not fit the definition of an apostate. We can eliminate that label right away. We are left with heresy and schism as possible options.

Schism can be eliminated too. Since these politicians insist that they are good Catholics, they imply with that statement that they recognize the authority of the Pope and the bishops who are successors to the Apostles. This leaves only heresy. Can we hold that a pro-abortion politician is a heretic? Let’s look closely at how the term is defined.

Heresy only applies to those Catholic truths which, the canon states, must be believed “with divine and Catholic faith.” This is explained in canon 750: Those things that are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith are contained in the word of God as it has been written or handed down by tradition, that is, in the deposit of faith entrusted to the Church, and are proposed as divinely revealed either by the solemn magisterium of the Church, or by its ordinary and universal magisterium.

So what does that mean? In a nutshell, there are different levels of Catholic beliefs. Some directly involve divine revelation, like the Resurrection of Christ from the dead. Others are less direct, but follow inescapably from these revelations, like the sanctity of human life. There are some which have caused legitimate disagreements among well meaning and certainly orthodox Catholic theologians, like the ban on ordaining women to the priesthood—all may very well agree that Catholics must accept this, but where does this teaching fit into the hierarchy of beliefs?  Still other church positions may not necessarily involve “belief” at all: a bishop might (for example) publicly oppose for ethical reasons the wording of a particular piece of tax legislation under consideration by the government. A Catholic who disagrees with some of these may have crossed the line and entered heretical territory, but that is certainly not true of all of them! One can, in countless cases, hold a position that is at variance with the public statements of our Catholic leaders, without automatically being a heretic.

Canon 750.1 definitely does not apply to any Catholic who disagrees about non-doctrinal positions like the legislation-example just mentioned. It definitely does apply to denial of Christ’s Resurrection. But there are a whole host of Catholic teachings in between those two extremes that for years left both canonists and theologians scratching their heads. That’s why in 1998, Pope John Paul II issued a motu proprio document, Ad Tuendam Fidem, in order to better clarify some of the grey areas and rewrite a couple of canons in the code. Soon after, Cardinal Ratzinger, then Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, issued a Commentary designed to complement the Pope’s document by providing some concrete examples.

Much of the (very complex) content of Ad Tuendam Fidem and the accompanying commentary is outside the scope of this article, but to sum up, the two documents created and explained somewhat clearer categories showing the different levels of Catholic beliefs. The commentary cited the example of “the doctrine on the grave immorality of direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being (11)” as being one of those doctrines to which

[e]very believer… is required to give firm and definitive assent…, based on faith in the Holy Spirit’s assistance to the Church’s Magisterium, and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Magisterium in these matters.Whoever denies these truths would be in a position of rejecting a truth of Catholic doctrineand would therefore no longer be in full communion with the Catholic Church (emphasis in the original Latin). (6)

This appears to indicate that someone who denies that directly, deliberately killing unborn children is gravely immoral would be in heresy. It means that he has rejected a Catholic teaching that is so fundamental to the faith, that denying it renders him a heretic. Whether he is a politician or not is actually irrelevant; for any Catholic who willfully rejects this teaching is essentially in the same boat.

Note that nowhere has the Pope explicitly said that consistently voting pro-abortion means that a Catholic politician has fallen into heresy; but it can be deduced fairly logically from both the canons and the Vatican documents described above. For a Catholic, this is very serious business. A heretic incurs excommunication latae sententiae, so he has brought upon himself the gravest penalty that the Church has to offer.

So does this mean that every Catholic politician who supports abortion “rights” has excommunicated himself? Not so fast. As we saw at the beginning of this column, no penalty of any kind is incurred if any of the conditions listed in canon 1323 are missing. The item on the list which is most relevant to the case at hand is the requirement that the perpetrator not be ignorant that he is violating the law by his action (c. 1323 n. 2). In other words, the politician has to know and appreciate the theological and canonical implications of his pro-abortion stance. If he doesn’t—if, in his ignorance, he erroneously thinks that he has some wiggle-room on this issue, or if he sincerely yet wrongly feels he can take the “personally opposed, but” line of defense as a way out—he incurs no penalty.

Before readers scoff at this notion, let’s acknowledge frankly the abysmal lack of sound catechetical formation of so many Catholics, both children and adults, here in the US. Countless Catholics have attended public schools as children, and received little or no education in CCD programs—perhaps because of parental negligence, perhaps because those programs were devoid of solid Catholic content. Other Catholics have been educated in Catholic schools where the religious instruction was either inadequate or of questionable orthodoxy. Many converts to the Catholic faith have received poor catechesis in their RCIA programs before they became Catholics. If we wanted to engage in recriminations, we could probably point accusing fingers in numerous directions here; but the sad fact remains, a huge number of American Catholics simply don’t understand even the most basic truths of our faith!

There is an obvious remedy for this problem, in the case of our Catholic politicians. By teaching clearly and unequivocally, our clergy can (and often do) explain the grave consequences of supporting abortion. In some cases, pastors and bishops have apparently judged it most prudent to meet with politicians who live in their parishes/dioceses on an individual basis, in order to counsel them about the implications of their actions, and to warn them of the spiritual consequences. We know that the Pope himself has met with Catholic politicians from the US on occasion, and the issue may have been addressed in the course of these private meetings as well. At issue here is not only the legal status of unborn children in our country; the spiritual well-being of these politicians must also be of great concern to those clergy who are responsible for their care.

And as angry as we may get with some of our political representatives, the fact remains that we should never lose sight of the importance of the salvation of their souls! Let’s return to the earlier observation that excommunication is a medicinal penalty. The whole purpose of excommunicating a Catholic is to ensure that he strives to get himself out of that state as soon as possible! After all, a member of the Catholic faithful should want to remain a member of the faithful, shouldn’t he? That’s why excommunication is intended to serve as a kind of alarm-bell, to tell a Catholic that he has overstepped his boundaries and needs to come back—sooner rather than later.

So what is the final answer to Patti’s question? It has several parts. First, it is indeed possible to excommunicate oneself; under certain circumstances church authorities do not need to make any declaration whatsoever. Second, asserting that politicians who promote abortion are excommunicated is not clear-cut under the Code of Canon Law, although an argument can certainly be made that they have in so doing obstinately denied a truth which constitutes a key component of the Catholic faith, and have thus fallen into heresy. It would certainly be helpful to all of us Catholics in the US for our bishops to provide us, publicly and repeatedly, with consistent, authoritative teaching on this matter. Next, for any penalty to apply, the politician would have to fully understand that holding his pro-abortion position constitutes a rejection of Catholic teaching that is heretical, and that this is an excommunicable offense. And finally, nobody should ever gleefully rejoice that a Catholic has been excommunicated; we should save that joy for the moment when that Catholic makes the prayerful decision that he needs to change his ways… and come home.

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Celibacy and the Priesthood

Posted on September 30, 2010 by canonlawmadeeasy

Q: If Catholic priests have to embrace celibacy, how is it possible for married converts from the Episcopal church to be ordained Catholic priests? This doesn’t make any sense to me.  –Phil

A: Phil is referencing the Apostolic Constitution signed by Pope Benedict in November 2009, providing norms designed for the large numbers of former Anglicans (who in the US are generally known as Episcopalians) wishing to enter the Catholic Church. But before we take a look at what that document says, perhaps it would be best to examine first what the Church says in general about priestly celibacy, and why.

Nearly 45 years ago, the Second Vatican Council issued a decree on the ministry and life of priests. Presbyterorum Ordinis reaffirmed the Catholic Church’s age-old position that celibacy—that is, abstaining from marriage—is especially suitable for the clergy.

Through… celibacy observed for the Kingdom of Heaven, priests are consecrated to Christ by a new and exceptional reason. They adhere to him more easily with an undivided heart, they dedicate themselves more freely in him and through him to the service of God and men, and they more expeditiously minister to his Kingdom and the work of heavenly regeneration, and thus they are apt to accept, in a broad sense, paternity in Christ. In this way they profess themselves before men as willing to be dedicated to the office committed to them… (16)

As we have seen countless times before in this space, canon law follows theology. Thus it should surprise no one that canon 277.1, which is worded in a very theological way, echoes the same sentiments: Clerics are bound to observe perfect and perpetual continence [i.e., refraining from sexual relations] for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven, and are thus bound to celibacy. It notes further that celibacy is a special gift of God by which sacred ministers can more easily remain close to Christ with an undivided heart, and can dedicate themselves more freely to the service of God and neighbor.

Clearly, therefore, priests are not permitted to marry. In fact, it is impossible for an ordained priest to marry validly in the Catholic Church: canon 1087 states unequivocally that those in sacred orders invalidly attempt marriage. The only way that a man who has already been ordained a priest can get married in the eyes of the Church is for him to have been previously returned to the lay state (which was discussed in greater detail in “Can a Priest Ever Return to the Lay State?”).

But if a priest cannot marry, does it logically follow that a married man cannot be ordained a priest? Well, canon 1042 n. 1 would suggest that this is indeed the case, because it states that a man who has a wife is impeded from ordination to the priesthood. The wording of this canon indicates that a widower, who was indeed married but no longer has a wife, can be ordained a Catholic priest; but so long as the wife is still living, ordination of the husband is not possible.  It would seem that the issue is thus closed and there is nothing further to be said.

There is, however, more to the story.

As we saw back in “Are There Any Limitations on the Power of the Pope?” there are basically two sources for the laws contained in the Code of Canon Law. Some are held to be divine laws, given to us by Christ Himself, and thus they can never be changed. Others, however, are termed “merely ecclesiastical laws,” since they were established by human authority. As such these can be changed by human authority as well—or else, rather than completely changing a law that is of purely human origin, church authorities can grant a dispensation from following it in an individual case. The whole concept of dispensation was discussed in detail back in “Marriage Between a Catholic and a Non-Catholic.”  An excellent, concrete example of this just arose recently in “Can Cousins Marry in the Church?” where we saw that the law which bars first cousins from marrying in the Church can be dispensed by the diocesan bishop. The canon preventing first cousins from getting married is not held to be a divine law, so exceptions can be made and such marriages can validly take place with the appropriate advance approval.

So to get back to the question at hand, can a married man receive a dispensation and be validly ordained a Catholic priest? The answer is yes.

We know that initially, married men were indeed permitted to become priests in the early centuries of the Church. In fact, to this day, some of the eastern-rite Catholic Churches, such as the Maronites, ordain married men on a regular basis. (See “Are They Really Catholic? Part I” for a more ample discussion of these culturally non-Western but definitely Catholic Churches.) We cannot deduce from the historical evidence that the obligation to be celibate is of divine law—many of those ordained by the Apostles themselves, in the years immediately following Christ’s resurrection and ascension into Heaven, were evidently married men! We can only conclude that the ban on ordaining married men to the priesthood is of human, rather than divine origin.

It follows logically that it is possible for married men to receive a dispensation and to be ordained as Catholic priests. But the next question we have to ask is, are there ever situations when that is a good idea?

We know that under the late Pope John Paul II, there were numerous cases of Episcopalian clergy who were received into the Catholic Church. Many of them had wives and families, since Episcopalian clerics are permitted to marry. When they became Catholics, they frequently asked to become Catholic priests as well (after some Catholic seminary training, of course).  John Paul frequently permitted these married men to be ordained as Catholic priests. They were thus dispensed from the canon that forbids this.

This brings us to the heart of Phil’s question. More recently, in light of the large numbers of American Episcopalians and British Anglicans who wish to become Catholics, the Vatican determined that some procedure needed to be developed to facilitate their reception into the Church. After all, in the wake of the recent episcopal ordinations of homosexuals among Episcopalians here in the US, we have witnessed entire Episcopal parishes that have objected and decided to become Catholic—pastor, congregation, and all!

Thus the Apostolic Constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus was issued by Pope Benedict on November 4th of last year. Its purpose was to provide a consistent system to be followed when these groups of Episcopalians/Anglicans sought reception into the Catholic Church. While much of this document is straightforward (and outside the scope of this column), one part received quite a lot of attention.

Section VI.2 addresses the issue of those clergymen who wish to be ordained as Catholic priests after becoming Catholics. It notes that the diocesan bishops who receive these new Catholics are, as a rule, allowed only to ordain those men who are celibate, in accord with canon 277.1. However, it adds that the bishop can petition the Pope to admit already married men to priestly ordination on a case-by-case basis.

There were a number of stories in the media at that time which suggested that perhaps this was a relaxation of the Church’s rules about celibacy and the priesthood. In fact, as we’ve seen above, it was nothing of the sort! The possibility of permitting married men to be ordained Catholic priests has always existed in the Church, and there were already cases when this was allowed well before Anglicanorum Coetibus was ever issued.

The Complementary Norms, a list of practical instructions on implementing the document which was issued on the same day, reaffirm that requests to admit married men to the Catholic priesthood must be approved by the Pope. But they also add some more specific information about dealing with a couple of concrete scenarios. Catholic priests who left the Church to marry, and later became Episcopalian clerics, are not going to be permitted to function as Catholic priests again (VI.1), although of course they will be welcomed back into the Church as Catholics if they wish. And those Episcopalian clerics who are in “irregular marriage situations” will not be allowed to become Catholic priests either. Presumably this includes divorced and remarried men, men who have married divorced women, or others whose marriages cannot be recognized as valid in the eyes of the Church.

In fact, the rules contained in these two documents about permitting married men to be ordained Catholic priests are actually quite strict. There is no way that one may reasonably construe this as an “opening of the flood-gates” leading to a general acceptance of married priests in the Church. Rather, it is a concession to individual persons who functioned as non-Catholic clerics in the past, and who naturally would like to continue in a comparable function now that they have become Catholics.

One can see how Pope Benedict approaches the whole notion of priestly celibacy from a fascinating exchange during a question-and-answer session, which he held at the Vatican for priests from all over the world just a few months ago. A Slovak priest asked him for guidance in explaining the true meaning of celibacy. Here is part of the Pope’s extemporaneous response:

…[C]elibacy… is a definitive “yes,” it is allowing ourselves to be taken in hand by God, giving ourselves into the hands of the Lord, into His “I,” and therefore it is an act of fidelity and trust, an act that the fidelity of marriage also supposes; …it is precisely the definitive “yes” that supposes, that confirms the definitive “yes” of marriage…. And if this disappears, the root of our culture will be destroyed.

Readers will probably not be surprised that our Pope has a profound understanding and appreciation of a celibate priesthood. While there are a relatively few, specific cases in which married priests are permitted, they constitute an exception to a law which, though not specifically of divine origin, appears to be here to stay. Permissions to the contrary may be given in individual instances, but this does not negate the great beauty of a priest’s complete self-sacrifice to God, a concept which developed well over 1000 years ago in the Church—and, according to the Pope, with good reason.

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Can Cousins Marry in the Church?

Posted on September 9, 2010 by canonlawmadeeasy

Q: Can cousins get married in the Church? I don’t want to marry my cousin, I’m just wondering!  –Jeremy

A: When it comes to the biological relationship between prospective spouses, the Church has laws which are based on natural law. We all know that genetic problems tend to arise in children whose parents are too closely related by blood. Canon law is therefore simply reflecting what nature (i.e., God) intended.

A casual reader of canon 1091, the canon which directly addresses Jeremy’s question, will most likely find it hopelessly confusing. Among other things, it states that marriage is invalid between persons related by consanguinity in all degrees of the direct line (c. 1091.1), and that in the collateral line, marriage is invalid up to and including the fourth degree (c. 1091.2). Understanding how to apply these abstract rules to concrete cases probably requires a little unpacking first!

To begin with, it would be helpful to clarify some terms. “Consanguinity” refers only to biological, blood relationships (and not to relationships created through marriage, such as that between a mother-in-law and her son-in-law).  The “direct line” refers to direct descendants—parents, grandparents, children and grandchildren. Knowledge of the meanings of these two terms should help us now to understand canon 1091.1: marriage is always invalid between parent and child, grandparent and grandchild, great-grandparent and great-grandchild, etc. This should certainly be no surprise to anyone, because we are quite comfortable with the notion, founded in natural law, that such marriages are forbidden. (Natural law is, incidentally, the rationale behind the fact that these marriages are against the civil law as well.)

While direct-line consanguinity is pretty easy to calculate, figuring other blood relationships can quickly become rather complex. The term “collateral line” refers to all relationships that at least partly involve siblings. Brothers and sisters are the clearest example of relatives in the collateral line, but collateral-line consanguinity refers also to relations between aunt/uncle and niece/nephew—as well as to cousins.

Complications arise because as we all know, there are various types of aunt/uncle and niece/nephew relationships (great-aunt and great-nephew is one example), and there are certainly many types of cousins. What we popularly term “first cousins,” for example, are the children of two siblings, but there are second- and third-cousins to contend with as well. The list of collateral relationships goes on and on!

To make the picture even more confusing, the Code of Canon Law is based on old Roman law when it comes to family relationships, so it doesn’t use our common terminology. That’s why the term “first cousin,” for example, is found nowhere in the code. In canon 108, the code provides some general definitions to explain the system it does use, which involves lines and degrees.

We’ve already seen how the “lines” work; consanguinity involves either direct lines or collateral lines. But how does one calculate the “degrees”? Let’s take a few cases as examples, to see how it works, and then see how canon 1091 on marriage directly applies to them.

Picture two siblings, Nancy and Mark. They are two people with a common ancestor (or in this case, two common ancestors—their parents). In accord with canon 108.3, we count the persons in both lines, but not the common ancestor(s). There are only two people involved here, and therefore Nancy and Mark’s relationship is considered second-degree consanguinity in the collateral line.

Can Nancy and Mark marry validly in the Church? Obviously not, because canon 1091.2 states that marriage in the collateral line is invalid up to the fourth degree, and their relationship is much closer than that.

Now imagine Uncle Bill and his niece Susan. Let’s say that Susan’s mother Mary is the sister of Uncle Bill. In this case, their “common ancestor” would be the parent(s) of Bill and Mary. In accord with the same canon 108.3, we count all persons involved in this relationship, except for the common ancestor: Susan, Bill, and Mary add up to three. Thus we can say that uncle and niece are related in the third degree of the collateral line.

Can Bill and Susan marry in the Catholic Church? Again, canon 1091.2 gives us the answer: any marriage in the collateral line up to the fourth degree is invalid. Since Bill and Susan are related in the third degree, they cannot marry validly.

This brings us now to the relationship addressed in Jeremy’s question: what is the degree of consanguinity between two cousins? Well, let’s imagine Cousin Jenny and Cousin Mike. Jenny’s mother, Beth, is the sister of Mike’s father, David. The common ancestor(s) in this case is the parent(s) of Beth and David. If we count all the persons involved in this relationship, minus the common ancestor, we find four persons involved. So these two cousins—who in our parlance are “first cousins”—are related in the fourth degree of the collateral line.

So can Cousin Jenny validly marry Cousin Mike? Not according to canon 1091.2, which says marriages are invalid up to and including the fourth degree. First cousins, therefore, cannot marry in the Church.

As for second, third, and other cousins, however, their degree of consanguinity is farther removed—they are related in the fifth, sixth, and even further degrees of the collateral line. According to canon 1091, therefore, these cousins can get married in the Catholic Church.

If readers’ heads are spinning by this point, there’s no shame in feeling confused—because it is confusing! And unfortunately, there’s one more added twist to complicate things even further.

We saw in “Could the Pope Change the Law to Allow Women Priests?” that some of the Church’s laws are held to be divine laws, while others are “merely” ecclesiastical laws. The latter have been established by human authority, but the former were instituted by God Himself. The Church holds that if a law was made by church authorities, it can be dispensed if there is sufficient justification for doing so. (We looked at the whole concept of dispensation back in “Marriage Between a Catholic and a Non-Catholic.”) In contrast, church laws which are believed to stem directly from a divine command, or are otherwise reflections of natural law, can never be dispensed in any case.

It shouldn’t be difficult to appreciate why church authorities will never grant a dispensation that permits a father to marry his daughter, or a sister to marry her brother. These relationships are so close that such a marriage would be considered a violation of natural law—and thus contrary to what God has intended.

But as for two first cousins… the Church’s position is that they are forbidden to marry only by ecclesiastical law, not by divine law. For this reason it is canonically possible to receive a dispensation that permits two first-cousins to marry validly in the Catholic Church.  (This assumes, of course, that it is legal under civil law in the area where the marriage is to take place—and in the U.S., some states permit it, while others don’t.)

History buffs are undoubtedly well aware of countless examples of such dispensations granted to members of European royal families in centuries past. Often it was argued—convincingly—that it was politically expedient for the two cousins to marry, because their wedding would contribute to peaceful relations between their two countries. Sadly, the bloodlines of most royal houses became so intertwined that significant genetic problems eventually arose among some family members. The daughter of Spain’s Ferdinand and Isabella, for example, was apparently insane and became known as “Juana la Loca,” or “Joan the Mad.” And just a couple of generations later, Carlos, the eldest son of Spain’s King Phillip II, was born physically handicapped and mentally unstable. It is commonly understood that too much intermarriage between too many cousins wreaked genetic havoc within Europe’s royal families, leading to the various medical problems suffered by these and numerous other royals.

Fortunately, the ostensible political need for repeated dispensations permitting such marriages is a thing of the past. While a diocesan bishop may certainly grant a dispensation allowing two first-cousins to marry, rest assured that he will take a closer look at any other relations between the two families’ bloodlines first.  The Church will always watch out for the best interests of the faithful, which in some cases may involve allowing two first-cousins to marry. But in general, we can see here a good instance of canon law working hand-in-hand with natural law—which, after all, was established by God Himself.

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Does Mass Have to be Said in a Church?

Posted on August 27, 2010 by canonlawmadeeasy

Q: Does a priest have to say Mass in a church?  –Paula

A: Now this is a simple question with an answer that is perhaps more complex than one would think!

When Canon 897 states that the Eucharistic Sacrifice is the source and summit of all worship and Christian life, it is quoting verbatim from Vatican II’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium (11). Since, as we have seen so many times before in this space, canon law follows theology, the direct connection between the Code of Canon Law and a theological conciliar document should not be at all surprising. Canonical requirements concerning the sacraments are driven by the theological significance of those sacraments; thus it is entirely logical that the tremendous reverence which the Church teaches us to have for the Eucharist plays out in the canons that pertain to the celebration of Mass.

Canon 932.1 states that the Eucharistic celebration is to be carried out in a sacred place, unless a particular necessity requires otherwise, in which case it is to be held in another, suitable place. The most obvious “sacred place” is of course a church building; but this term also applies to chapels (called “oratories” in the code) that have been established as such by the diocesan bishop (cf. cc. 1223 and 1229). Such chapels are routinely found on college campuses, in hospitals, and in some countries even in airports and train stations.

This is the norm; but the canon immediately admits that there are admissible exceptions. In general, the Church’s assumption is that while Mass should be celebrated in the most reverent environment possible, it is often better to celebrate it in a less ideal place than not to celebrate it at all. What sort of scenario constitutes a “particular necessity” that would permit Mass to be celebrated in a place other than a church or chapel? For starters, any Catholic who has served in the military will point out that on countless occasions, Catholic priests who serve as military chaplains must of necessity celebrate the Eucharist in tents or in the open air, on land or at sea. To cite an example familiar to us all, how many Catholic churches are readily available to US soldiers serving right now in the Middle East?

An even more common situation in which Masses are offered in places other than a traditional church involves missionary areas. A missionary priest might travel hundreds of miles to a remote village, where he celebrates the liturgy in the back of his pickup truck, if no better option is available! Along similar lines, Masses must necessarily be offered in makeshift places in those areas where the Church is being persecuted (think communist China) or is simply forbidden to exist (like Saudi Arabia). In countries with few or no Catholic inhabitants, foreign embassies, particularly of those countries with a traditionally Catholic populace, often have priests on the ground who regularly celebrate the Eucharist inside the embassy compound for Catholic members of the diplomatic staff.

It goes without saying that offering a Mass under such conditions is less than ideal. But the reality is that many Catholics throughout the world do not have the luxury, as we do here in our country, of freely and openly travelling to a Catholic church for Mass on a regular basis. It would be difficult to argue that the Masses celebrated under these less-than-perfect circumstances are less reverent because of the place where they are held!

Note that canon 932.1 does not specifically mention any of the above scenarios. It provides a more general norm, that is to be interpreted and applied to particular concrete situations. So how does it apply to ordinary American daily life, which is devoid of political persecution and other extreme conditions like those mentioned above? Can one reasonably interpret that the Eucharist may (for example) be celebrated in a private home, in a hotel room, or outdoors?

Some additional guidelines for the celebration of Mass, which provide a bit more specific direction, are contained in the General Instruction on the Roman Missal (GIRM). As we saw back in “Can You be Refused Holy Communion if You Kneel?” the GIRM provides liturgical norms which are not addressed in the Code of Canon Law. These norms, approved by the Vatican’s Congregation for Divine Worship and the Sacraments, were published by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops in 2003. (See”Are Catholics Supposed to Abstain from Meat Every Friday?” for a more detailed discussion of the role of the Bishops’ Conference in the life of the Church.)While they do not actually form part of the code, these norms are really laws and are to be followed at all Catholic liturgical worship here in the United States.

Chapter V of the GIRM mentions the places which are suitable for the celebration of Mass. It notes that “for the celebration of the Eucharist, the people of God normally are gathered together in a church or, if there is no church or if it is too small, then in another respectable place that is nonetheless worthy of so great a mystery” (288). We can see here that once again, offering Mass in a church building is always the norm. If, however, a church has been damaged by earthquake or fire, or a group of Catholics is gathered for the Eucharist in a location where there simply is no Catholic church available, or there is a church but it is too small for the number of faithful present, it is entirely permissible to celebrate Mass elsewhere. Sometimes in such circumstances priests celebrate the Eucharist in a school auditorium or gymnasium, or in a fire hall or hotel conference room. Such locations are obviously not designed to be used for Mass, but they are not intrinsically inappropriate places either.

If a priest is travelling, and either there is no Catholic church at his destination, or he arrives there too late to get to it, there is no particular reason why he may not celebrate Mass privately in his hotel room. Again, this is a less than ideal location, but ordinarily there is nothing inherently objectionable about a normal room in a typical hotel that would render it unsuitable for Mass.

Similarly, if a priest is on some outdoor excursion, far from buildings of any kind, he may celebrate Mass outside in an appropriate place. Before his election to the papacy, John Paul II frequently led groups of Polish teenagers on camping and hiking trips, and every morning they would find a clean, level rock or tree stump upon which he celebrated the Eucharist for them.

Could Mass be celebrated in a non-Catholic church? As a general rule, it may not, because the confusion that this might cause in the minds of simple, uneducated members of the Catholic faithful (not to mention the members of the non-Catholic church!) is potentially very great. After all, if a Catholic priest offers Catholic Mass in (let’s say) a Lutheran church, and a couple of hours later the Lutheran pastor leads a Lutheran Sunday Service in the same place, many people might naturally think that there is little difference between the two.  If this were to happen on a regular basis, one could easily envision that Catholics soon would begin attending the Lutheran service, and Lutherans the Catholic Mass, with little or no regard for the significant theological differences between them.

But as surprising as it may seem, the code actually does permit a Catholic Mass to be celebrated in a non-Catholic church under very specific circumstances, and there is a solid rationale for this permission. Canon 933 states that if (a) there is a good reason, (b) the diocesan bishop permits it, and (c) care has been taken to eliminate the possibility of scandal, a Catholic priest may offer the Eucharist in a non-Catholic church building. Imagine, for example, that a huge Catholic parish church, with thousands of parishioners, has been demolished in a hurricane. A nearby Baptist church was spared, and its pastor kindly offers the Catholic pastor the use of the church early on Sunday mornings, before the Baptist service. If the diocesan bishop approves, and the situation is explained very clearly to the Catholics of the area, the Catholic pastor may indeed use the Baptist church for Mass—until, of course, the Catholic church is rebuilt. Obviously this is a less than ideal situation, and it is not intended to be permanent. But the Church realizes that it is far better for Catholics to temporarily attend Catholic Mass in a non-Catholic church, than not to have Mass at all!

Thus far there seem to be numerous situations in which offering Mass in a place other than a Catholic church is permissible. So are there any scenarios in which it would not be allowed?

The key to interpreting the rule involves necessity. In all of the permitted examples referenced above, there was a real need to offer Mass outside of a Catholic church. If such a Eucharistic celebration were not permitted, the Mass could not take place.

So it logically follows that if a Catholic church is readily available, under normal circumstances it is difficult at best to justify the celebration of Mass elsewhere. Using a private home, when the residents are fully capable of coming to the parish church, or saying Mass in the parish garden, when the crowd could easily fit inside the church building, would not be in accord with either the code or the norms of the GIRM. If Mass can be said in the church, then it should be said in the church!

We see that the Church is realistic about the many difficult situations that Catholics face throughout the world, and is not hesitant to make accommodations so that they can participate in the celebration of the Eucharist insofar as it is possible. At the same time, however, the sacred nature of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass is to be upheld as much as it can. The Church thus engages in a balancing act, always with the good of the souls of the Catholic faithful in mind. Whenever possible, they should not be deprived of the great privilege of participating in the Mass.

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Are They Excommunicated? Sanctions, Part IV

Posted on August 12, 2010 by canonlawmadeeasy

Q1: I remember that Archbishop Burke excommunicated a couple of women who claimed that they had been ordained Catholic priests a couple of years ago. Now I read that the Vatican has issued rules about punishing women who do that. Does that undo Archbishop Burke’s punishment of them? Does the Vatican think that he handled it the wrong way? –Sally

Q2: Why did the Vatican lump women who want to be priests into the same document with pedophile priests recently? I understand that women can’t be priests, but are they really as bad as child molesters?  –Laurie

A: It is true that a new document was made public by the Vatican recently, addressing (among many other things) the issue of women’s ordination to the priesthood. But before discussing it, let’s take a look at some of the history that led up to its release.

As we saw back in “Can Women be Ordained Priests?” and “Could the Pope Change the Law to Allow Women Priests?” women cannot be ordained to the Catholic priesthood. Canon 1024 states unequivocally that only a baptized male can be validly ordained. If a woman, therefore, goes through the identical ordination ceremony, the sacrament of Holy Orders is not conferred upon her, as the sacrament has no effect.

But as many of us already know, there are a number of women, in the United States and elsewhere, who insist that they have been ordained as Catholic priests. Some of them even claim to be Catholic bishops! We Catholics who understand our faith are well aware that these claims are absurd; but there is no doubt that many other Catholics, who are uneducated (or badly educated) in the Church’s teachings, can be confused all too easily by these women. After all, when simple Catholics see a woman wearing priestly vestments, standing at an altar and saying the words of consecration over bread and wine, what are they to think?

In 2008, the then-Archbishop of St. Louis, Raymond Burke, issued a public declaration against three Catholic women who had been involved in such an “ordination” in his archdiocese—two of them claiming to have been ordained by the third. He noted that the woman acting as “bishop” had started a new organization here in the US, with a “hierarchy” that is outside the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and he determined that this constituted an act of schism.

Schism is, according to canon 751, the withdrawal of submission to the Supreme Pontiff, or from communion with the members of the Church subject to him. Establishing one’s own clerical structure, with deacons, priests, and bishops who are not subject to the Pope, certainly does fit this definition. Thus the Archbishop found that the woman who claimed to have “ordained” the other two women had, by her establishment of a new hierarchical structure that is obviously not in communion with the Holy Father, committed an act of schism. The penalty for such an act is excommunication (c. 1364.1).

Thus the female “bishop” was found to be excommunicated. As for the other two women, Archbishop Burke noted that by knowingly and willingly participating in an “ordination” by the female “bishop,” and being aware all the while that they were involving themselves in a schismatic organization, they had likewise committed an act of schism and were consequently under the same penalty.

Note that the Archbishop had first sent a formal, written warning to each of these women, advising them of the seriousness of their action and giving them the opportunity to repent (which they failed to do). This was pastoral move on the Archbishop’s part, to warn these women of the gravity of the steps they were taking. As we discussed in “Am I Excommunicated? Sanctions, Part I,” excommunication is known as a medicinal penalty. The Church wants an excommunicated member to understand the seriousness of his actions, and to come back. It is always hoped that the person to be excommunicated will realize the grave nature of his crime, and will repent and return to full communion with the Church.

Just a few weeks after the incident in St. Louis, the Bishop of Winona, Minnesota was faced with a similar situation in his diocese, and correctly declared that the woman who had attempted to be ordained had excommunicated herself. (We’ll take a closer look at the notion of self-excommunication in a future column.)

During this period, there were plenty of other occasions, in dioceses throughout the world, where women claimed to have been ordained Catholic priests, and subsequently celebrated “Mass” and administered other “sacraments.” In the meantime, organizations dedicated to promoting acceptance of the ordination of women were formed, both in the US and elsewhere. It became obvious enough to the Vatican that this was not an issue that would quickly go away! And to make matters worse, there was understandable confusion about the best way for bishops to address the problem when it arose in their own dioceses.

To clarify the situation from a legal standpoint, the CDF issued a general decree in early 2008, noting that women who attempt to be ordained, and anyone attempting to ordain a woman, both incur excommunication. (Note that in each of these cases, reference is always made to “attempted” ordination, because when a woman participates in a Catholic ordination ceremony, no ordination ever actually takes place.) Now nobody could make the argument that, say, the Bishop of Winona overreacted, or the Archbishop of St. Louis was too hasty. Now no one could suggest that when faced with such women, the best course of action was to impose a lighter penalty, or simply to ignore it.

With the 2008 decree from the CDF, the law seemed clear enough in these cases—so what was the need for the additional, recent Vatican document that our two questioners are referencing? It is actually an updating of another, already existing document. Back in 2001, Pope John Paul II issued a motu proprio document, Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela (SST, which translates as, “The Safeguarding of the Sanctity of the Sacraments”), by which he gave the authority to judge certain crimes to the CDF in Rome. At the time, the press widely described the document as one devoted to the issue of clerical sexual abuse. While it’s true that this crime is included in the list of delicts in the document, it is actually only one of several. The main purpose of the document was to give the CDF jurisdiction over crimes involving the sacraments—desecration of the Eucharist, for example, or violation of the seal of confession—and the issue of priestly abuse of children was definitely not the original, central reason for issuing the document. In fact, technically speaking, this crime is not even a delict involving the administration of a sacrament, unless it involves a priest molesting a minor within the confessional (as unfortunately it sometimes does).

The purpose of SST was to ensure that when allegations of such serious crimes are made, they are handled in a uniform, consistent way throughout the entire Church. It is not possible now for (let’s say) a bishop in France to choose to completely ignore an allegation of clerical sexual abuse, while a bishop in Chile imposes the highest possible penalty in an identical situation.  The CDF must be notified of all such allegations, and will determine the way in which each bishop is to handle a given case. In other words, the process for investigating and judging such cases has now been centralized in Rome. SST did not create any new crimes or penalties; it provided norms for the manner in which the penalties already spelled out in the Code of Canon Law would be applied to activities which the code already specified were criminal.

On May 21, 2010, it was announced that Pope Benedict was revising certain sections of the SST norms.  This is the document that our two questioners mention, and while the majority of the provisions of SST remain unchanged, the revision does make some procedural changes (many of which are of little interest unless you happen to be a canon lawyer). The change that seems to be garnering the most public attention is the inclusion of the delict of attempted ordination of a woman as one of the crimes now covered by SST. Since it is a crime that involves a sacrament, it is entirely appropriate for it to be on the list of delicts that are to be handled directly by the CDF.

No longer does a bishop have to decide on his own how best to handle such cases if they come up in his diocese. He now notifies the CDF, providing them with all the necessary information, and it is the officials of the CDF who are responsible for instructing the bishop on how best to proceed. This ensures that allegations all over the world are handled in as uniform and consistent a manner as humanly possible.

Subsequently, many of the women who claim to have been ordained, and the organizations supporting them, have waxed indignant that by including women’s ordination in the new set of norms, their actions are being equated to child sexual abuse. But anyone who reads and understands the purpose of the document can see that it does nothing of the kind. The delicts now included in the new norms are listed together not because they are all equally reprehensible in a moral sense, but because they are to be handled in the same manner procedurally.  We can draw a parallel in US criminal law: in most states, stealing an expensive coat from a department store is a felony, and murder is also a felony. Trials for both crimes will therefore share some of the same procedural aspects—but this obviously does not imply that any state holds that stealing a coat is as morally reprehensible as taking another person’s life! Similarly, nobody in the Vatican has suggested that all of the delicts contained in the list found in SST are morally equal. The objection of these women, therefore, is devoid of merit.

What these women seem to be missing, however, is that all of the crimes found in SST are violations of church law, and as such they should be avoided by faithful Catholics at all costs! In that sense, there is no such thing as a ”greater” or “lesser” delict here. Playing games with the sacraments is no small matter—and the Pope has made it plain that the Church will take seriously all attempts to abuse them.

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